Economic development and the accumulation of know-how by Hausmann, Ricardo
Welsh Economic Review
13
Economic development depends on the 
accumulation of know-how. The theory 
of economic growth has long emphasised 
the importance of something called 
technical progress, but what that is, 
and how it grows has not been well 
elucidated. Technical progress is really 
based on three separate aspects: tools, 
or embodied knowledge, recipes or 
blueprints or codified knowledge and 
know-how or tacit knowledge. While 
tools can be shipped and codes can be 
e-mailed, know-how exists only as a 
particular wiring of the brain and as 
such it is hard to move around. That is 
why the growth of know-how can easily 
become the binding constraint on the 
development process.
This means that an important implication 
of the growth of know-how has been 
ignored. It is our brain’s capacity to do 
things that we are not fully conscious 
of, and that we do not understand, even 
conceptually, but we know how to do. For 
example, we know how to walk but we do 
not really understand what we do in order 
to walk: which muscles we move and how 
we keep our balance. As a consequence, 
we do not transmit the ability to walk 
by talking about it to our children. They 
learn from imitation and repetition over 
a protracted period of time, just as they 
learn to play an instrument or to speak 
a language. Transferring tacit knowledge 
or know-how, is more difficult and 
generally takes longer than passing on 
objective knowledge.
Such know-how can only grow at 
the society level through increasing 
specialisation by individuals. Individuals 
have a limited capacity to acquire 
knowledge and know-how because life is 
limited and learning takes time. Let us 
call a “personbyte” the amount of know-
how that comfortably sits in a brain. This 
implies that as knowledge and know-how 
expand, each individual must possess 
a smaller and smaller proportion of the 
whole corpus. They become specialised. 
In some ways a modern person with a 
detailed knowledge of an obscure subject 
cuts a less impressive figure than an 
Eskimo who knows how to fish and feed 
himself, how to build his own igloo and 
generally has all the skills needed to 
survive in a hostile environment. The 
modern person by contrast cannot make 
his own clothes, does not know how to 
hunt or butcher his own meat or how to 
manufacture the computer he works with. 
Yet the society of the modern person is 
much richer and more productive than 
that of the Eskimo because it knows how 
to do more things and do them more 
efficiently.
Adam Smith’s pin factory required 
increased specialisation of tasks; the 
same specialisation is required of know-
how. As economic development proceeds, 
societies acquire the capabilities to make 
more and more complex products. This 
means that the other side of the coin 
of individual specialisation is the fact 
that production requires teamwork and 
co-operation among larger and larger 
numbers of people. A clay pot is a more 
complex product than a stone-age axe 
but the knowledge required to produce 
it could reside within a single brain. 
A modern jet airliner is made up of 
thousands of components some of great 
complexity in themselves. Its production 
is spread across scores of companies 
that employ the know-how of thousands 
of individuals. It is a characteristic of 
developed economies that they have 
the know-how to make such complex 
products. Indeed development may be 
seen as exactly the acquisition of more 
and more know-how together with the 
arrangements to combine and recombine 
it to make complex products. Think of 
units of capability as elements of practical 
knowledge. The more such capabilities a 
society has, the richer it can be.
There is an analogy with the game of 
scrabble. Individual elements of know-
how or capabilities are like letters in 
the game. Products are like words. With 
three letters you can make rather few 
words. Double the number of letters and 
you much more than double the number 
of potential words because the letters can 
be combined in many different ways. You 
can also potentially make 6 letter words, 
i.e. more complex products. The 26 
letters of the Roman alphabet can make 
all the words in the dictionary which 
number in the hundreds of thousands.
Of course in a world of international 
trade, the know-how that can be 
embodied in goods and services can 
be effectively imported as machines or 
intermediate inputs that can be used to 
produce locally. If they can be brought 
in from other places, these elements will 
not restrict what can be produced in a 
given place. But for production to take 
place there, beyond intermediate inputs 
or machines, capable teams must be 
assembled in place and what teams can 
be put together will be limited by what 
know-how exists there.
Adam Smith remarked that specialisation 
was limited by the extent of the market. 
Since products can be exported to the 
whole world, the scope for specialisation 
is considerable. Places will never be able 
to have the know-how to do everything. 
But they can acquire the things they 
do not know how to do by trading for 
the things that they do know. As a 
consequence, the nature of the goods 
that can be done in a place and sold 
elsewhere have an outsized effect on the 
prosperity of that location. In particular, 
the salaries that the export sector can 
afford, given its productivity, will impact 
the salaries that everyone in that location 
will earn.
That some countries have developed 
more successfully than others implies 
that not all capabilities can be acquired 
through trade or that they move with 
great difficulty. Some capabilities may 
reside, for example, in the domestic 
political system that ensures security and 
a responsiveness to the requirements of 
productive co-operation or in the legal 
system that protects property rights and 
assures the sanctity of contracts. But 
the large difference in income within the 
same country suggests that the issue 
involves more than just national political 
institutions.
So our claim is that the accumulation 
of know-how at the societal level 
requires larger and larger networks of 
collaboration to effectively convert that 
know-how into a greater variety and 
complexity of production. To substantiate 
this claim we need a measurement of 
complexity as well as measures of output 
and study their relationship across 
countries and over time. Capabilities 
cannot readily be observed but there 
are methods of measuring complexity 
and know-how indirectly using trade1 or 
production2 data. Countries with lots of 
know-how should have a comparative 
advantage in the production of many 
different products rather than just a few. 
They should also have a comparative 
advantage in the production of complex 
products. Given a hierarchy of countries 
in terms of complexity, one would expect 
that the most complex products would 
be produced by relatively few countries 
- those at the top of the hierarchy. 
Moreover one would expect a strong 
positive correlation between the ranking 
of countries in that hierarchy and their 
ranking by GDP per head.
We define comparative advantage in 
a particular way, following Balassa 
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(1986). We say a country has a 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
in producing a given product if that 
product is a greater proportion by value 
of the country’s exports than its share 
of total world trade3. Using detailed 
disaggregated trade data we see how 
many such products there are among 
a country’s exports. If we arrange 
countries as the rows and the products 
as the columns of a matrix, we can enter 
a 1 for each product where a country 
has a comparative advantage and a zero 
otherwise. Each row sum then gives 
the number of such products for each 
country and is a measure of the diversity 
of each country’s competitive advantage.
Meanwhile the column sums tell us how 
many countries have a comparative 
advantage in a given product. The larger 
the column sum the more ubiquitous 
a product is and the less complex we 
would expect it to be. Products with low 
ubiquity will be one of two sorts: they 
could be products of great complexity or 
they could be naturally rare, like certain 
mineral resources such as gemstones. 
The two cases can be distinguished 
however because complex products 
will be produced by few countries and 
those countries will be highly diversified. 
Countries that are not diverse but which 
produce a rare export are generally 
producers of rare commodities.
An interesting feature of this matrix of 
comparative advantages is that it has 
a triangular structure. That is some 
countries have very diverse comparative 
advantage. They produce competitively 
many products. Other countries have 
many fewer products where they are 
competitive. This is the pattern we would 
expect if a country with capabilities 
makes all the products that are feasible 
with these capabilities. That goes against 
the grain of much of classical trade 
theory which predicts specialisation 
on the basis of comparative advantage 
and which would lead to the RCA matrix 
having a block-diagonal structure. In fact 
the RCA matrix suggests there is little 
specialisation even at the level of over 
5,000 products4.
We measure complexity not simply 
by diversity but by weighting exports 
where there is a comparative advantage 
both by their rarity value (the inverse 
of ubiquity) and by how far they are 
exported by other diverse countries with 
scarce exports. An index of complexity is 
obtained by an operation on the matrix 
which combines all that information 
to produce adjusted row sums after a 
series of iterations5. We call the resultant 
quantity for each country the economic 
complexity index or ECI6.
Now when we derive such an index 
and run a cross-country regression on 
GDP per capita, we do indeed find a 
compelling association. This association 
is that much stronger if we control for 
natural resource wealth as captured by 
a country’s exports per capita of mineral 
resources (See Figure 1). However, this 
association is more than just a static 
relationship. If we regress the growth in 
per capita income over 10-year periods 
on economic complexity, controlling 
for the initial income level and for any 
increase in natural resource income over 
the period we find that initial complexity 
explains future growth. Countries with 
a higher ECI than their GDP per head 
would lead one to expect tend to grow 
faster in the decade after the date of 
the regression data, while those with 
a low CDI relative to GDP tend to grow 
more slowly. The ECI explains over a 
third of the variance explained by the 
equation and an increase of one standard 
deviation in complexity is associated with 
a subsequent acceleration of a country’s 
growth rate of over 1 ½ per cent a year 
(Hausmann et al. 2014).
Indeed we find the ECI has better 
predictive properties than other measures 
like the World Bank’s measures of quality 
of governance or the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between 
income per capita and the Economic 
Complexity Index (ECI) for countries 
where natural resource exports are 
larger than 10% of GDP (red) and for 
those where natural resource exports are 
lower than 10% of GDP (blue). For the 
latter group of countries, the Economic 
Complexity Index accounts for 78% 
of the variance. Countries in which the 
levels of natural resource exports are 
relatively high tend to be significantly 
richer than what would be expected 
given the complexity of their economies, 
yet the ECI still correlates strongly with 
income for that group.
This reinforces us both in the view about 
the nature of economic development and 
in the usefulness of our data proxies. It 
raises questions however. What are the 
implications? Would this information 
enable us to refine development policy?
To pursue those questions, we note 
that products differ not only in their 
complexity but in their relationship to one 
another. We can conceptualize a product 
space as a space in which products have 
differing relationships to other products, 
just as trees in a forest are at different 
distances to other trees.
It is possible to draw up a map of the 
product space, using the trade data 
and to locate a country’s positioning 
within it. We infer the similarity in the 
capabilities required to produce two 
Figure 1: Economic Complexity and per capita income, 2010
Source: Hausmann et al., 2014.
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products by looking at the probability 
that they are co-exported. Proximity of 
products is measured by the conditional 
probability that a country exports one 
product given that it exports the other. 
“Exports” in this context means it has a 
revealed comparative advantage and an 
entry of one in the matrix of comparative 
advantage. Since conditional 
probabilities are not symmetric, we 
take the minimum. That avoids errors 
which can arise from some products 
being rare. If a product is exported by 
just one country, for example, all other 
products exported by that country would 
have a conditional probability of 1 with 
respect to the rare product, even though 
they may be unconnected. However, the 
reverse conditional probabilities would 
all be extremely low. We can compile 
another matrix of minimum conditional 
probabilities between each pair of 
products, a matrix of proximities.
This product space has a distinct 
structure: parts of the product space 
are very dense and other parts are quite 
sparse. For example, while machines 
tend to be complex products, they are 
also in a dense part of the product space 
because if you have the capabilities 
to make one type of machine, those 
capabilities can be redeployed to make 
another. This does not happen with 
either oil or mining products, where the 
capabilities required are less relevant for 
other forms of production.
To move into a new product, the country 
must secure the requisite capabilities. 
But this poses a chicken and egg or 
coordination problem. You do not 
accumulate know-how in things you do 
not do and it is impossible to do things 
without the requisite know-how. This 
dilemma is solved in the real world by 
diversifying into products that require 
much of the know-how that already 
resides in the country in question, so 
as to minimize the number of missing 
pieces.
There is an analogy with monkeys in 
a forest. In colonising the forest, the 
monkeys jump from a tree they occupy 
to a neighbouring tree. Remember that 
the distance between the trees in the 
forest, i.e. of products in the product 
space, is related to the similarity in the 
capabilities they require. Monkeys tend 
to jump to nearby trees, because far 
away trees require many capabilities 
that they do not have, aggravating the 
chicken and egg problem. If they are in a 
dense part of the forest they have many 
options to proceed with colonisation and 
it is easy to make rapid progress. If they 
are in an isolated part of the forest where 
there is a clump of trees separated by 
distance from the rest of the forest, 
they face greater coordination problems 
and progress is more difficult. There is 
therefore a premium on being in a dense 
part of the forest. It is better to be in the 
kind of technologies, that is, to have the 
kind of know-how which is applicable to 
many different products (see Hidalgo et 
al, 2007 for evidence on this process).
These results encompass a number 
of early attempts to explain trade 
patterns. If we group products according 
to factor intensity following Leamer 
(1984) or group them according to Lall’s 
technological classification (Lall, 2000), 
we find a generally somewhat higher 
average proximity within those groups 
than between them. Those classifications 
do capture important elements of the 
relationship among products but by no 
means all of the characteristics of the 
product space. Clearly there are other, 
more specific, factors at work too.
We may suppose that the product space 
is a structural relationship common to 
all countries. To locate a country in the 
product space we just need to know 
in which products it has comparative 
advantage. To calculate a measure of 
the probability that a country will be able 
to develop comparative advantage in a 
product it currently is not good at, we 
can calculate a weighted distance of the 
products it has comparative advantage in 
with that target product. Since we take 
the proximity measure to be reflecting the 
degree of factor commonality across two 
products then the probability of a country 
exporting any product in future should 
depend on that product’s proximity to the 
current export basket. We can combine 
the pairwise proximity measures for 
products with each country’s export 
basket to define density: the density of 
a country’s exports around a particular 
good. Regression analysis confirms that 
subsequent comparative advantage in 
a product is strongly associated with 
the previous density measure, that is, 
density is higher in products that were 
subsequently produced with comparative 
advantage. Structural change does 
depend on the topology of the product 
space.
Knowing the structure of the product 
space reveals where the best possibilities 
lie for diversification, which new products 
might be developed on the basis of 
existing know-how or with the addition 
of relatively little extra know-how.
If a country has many capabilities 
and is in a dense part of the product 
space, diversification and development 
might be expected to proceed faster. 
The opportunities to exploit existing 
capabilities in new ways will relatively 
abundant and chicken and egg problems 
will be less severe. Moreover, the 
underlying logic of the capabilities model 
of comparative advantage implies that 
the more capabilities a country has, the 
greater the expected benefit from adding 
another capability.
In fact, we can calculate a measure of 
the overall position of a country in the 
product space by adding the densities of 
all the products it does not currently have 
comparative advantage in, weighted 
by their complexity: being close to 
a complex product is more valuable 
than being close to a simple one. This 
measure, which we call Complexity 
Outlook Index has been shown to also 
be highly predictive of future growth 
in complexity and in income per capita 
(Hausmann et al., 2014).
Adding capabilities is more likely to be 
profitable and therefore more likely to 
happen the more capabilities are present 
in a country and the better the position 
of the country in the product space. In 
the fortunate circumstances in which a 
country has more capabilities than are 
expressed in its current level of income 
and is in a dense part of the product 
space, there may be little need for special 
government intervention. If growth is 
not occurring it would be appropriate 
to look for the constraints that are 
inhibiting development in what should be 
a promising situation (Hausmann et al., 
2008).
Where a country has few capabilities or is 
in a peripheral part of the product space, 
further diversification with existing 
capabilities may not be possible, while 
the acquisition of further capabilities may 
be too expensive for entrepreneurs to 
undertake in view of the expected returns. 
The acquisition of capabilities, however, 
is likely to have larger social benefits 
than the profits that can be captured by 
the entrepreneur. This is because the 
possibility for further recombinations of 
new capabilities and the fact that the 
acquisition of a particular capability may 
make the development of yet another 
capability more profitable. In those 
circumstances it would be appropriate 
for the government to promote the 
acquisition of key capabilities that would 
permit further diversification. In directing 
such support either the government itself 
or, more likely, the entrepreneur would 
benefit from having knowledge, tacit or 
explicit, of the product space. The fewer 
capabilities a country has, the more 
likely it is that capabilities could be most 
easily acquired by encouraging foreign 
investment that brings in additional 
capability. We also find that neighbours, 
migrants, spin-offs and even business 
travel play an important role in the 
diffusion of capabilities.
We started with the assumption that 
know-how is the hardest component 
of technical progress to be mobilised, 
and as such can become the binding 
constraint of the development process. 
A reinterpretation of this process from 
the viewpoint of know-how allows us 
to describe the development process 
differently and leads us to tools and 
policy approaches that may enrich the 
debate of what to do to promote the 
prosperity of a region or a country.
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Notes
1. The trade data is disaggregated to SITC 4-digit level. For a demonstration of how a range of different capabilities and their 
distribution can lead to pattern of comparative advantage in different goods. See Hausmann R. and C.A. Hidalgo (2011).
2. Trade data has the advantage that all countries report it with a standardized classification, while there is more variation in the 
classification systems used for production data. However, we can use production data to analyse the variation of the complexity of 
production and income within countries. See for example Hausmann et al., (2014).
3. Let Scp be the share country c has of the world market for product p and Tp be the share of product p in the total world market.
Then RCAcp = Scp/Tp since Tp = Σ Scp
The country has a revealed comparative advantage if RCA ≥ a, some threshold. We take a =1.
4. These trade data are for goods only. We have reason to believe however that adding services, were the data available, would 
not change the pattern. A study of production data for 347 municipalities in Chile and 700 industrial categories, including services, 
generated a matrix of industrial production by area. It had the same triangular structure with Santiago producing most products 
while remote rural areas produced few.
5. If the RCA matrix is denoted as Mcp, we define Diversity = kc,0 = pΣ Mcp ; and Ubiquity = kp,0 = cΣ Mcp. A recursion known as the 
method of reflections progressively adjusts exports for their ubiquity and adjusts products for the diversity of their exporters.
6. The first three recursions have a clear intuitive meaning where diversity has been corrected for ubiquity which itself has been 
corrected for diversity. After further iterations the process converges to give the ECI and an equivalent product complexity index. 
For detailed exposition see Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009).
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